Recent Developments: In re Billman: Disposition of Substitute Assets Possessed by Third Party and Subject to Rico Forfeiture May Be Enjoined by Szczesny, Charles
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 21
Number 2 Spring, 1991 Article 14
1991
Recent Developments: In re Billman: Disposition
of Substitute Assets Possessed by Third Party and
Subject to Rico Forfeiture May Be Enjoined
Charles Szczesny
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Szczesny, Charles (1991) "Recent Developments: In re Billman: Disposition of Substitute Assets Possessed by Third Party and Subject
to Rico Forfeiture May Be Enjoined," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 21 : No. 2 , Article 14.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol21/iss2/14
the bringing of an action." Id. at 257, 
577 A.2d at 68. The court explained that 
the Joneses could only succeed in their 
suit if they could prove that Dr. Speed 
had been negligent within the five years 
prior to filing the complaint. Thus, the 
, doctor could not be held liable for any 
negligence occurring before that period 
and, as such, he was protected to the 
extent that the legislature intended 
under §5-109. Id. at 257, 577 A.2d at 68. 
Finally, Dr. Speed argued that the 
long-standing prohibition against split-
ting a cause of action prevented the 
Joneses from bringing suit. He argued 
that had they brought suit for the initial 
act of negligence occurring on July 17, 
1978, their claim for relief would have 
necessarily included damages resulting 
from all subsequent negligent acts when 
her tumor remained undiscovered. Thus, 
because the Joneses were precluded 
from bringing suit on the initial negli-
gence and the initial negligence was so 
intertwined with the later negligence, 
to allow the Joneses to proceed on the 
later counts was the same as permitting 
them to split their cause of action. Id. at 
257-58, 577 A.2d at 68. 
The court agreed that splitting a cause 
of action is prohibited in order "to pre-
vent multiplicity of litigation and to 
avoid the vexation, costs and expenses 
incident to more than one suit on the 
same cause of action." Ex Parte Carlin, 
212 Md. 526, 532-33, 129 A.2d 827 
(1957) quoted injones, 320 Md. at 258, 
577 A.2d at 68 (1990). The flaw with 
Speed's reasoning, noted the court, was 
that the rules prohibiting splitting a 
cause of action, and application of res 
judicata principles only apply to situa-
tions where the plaintiff has in fact 
brought suit and a final adjudication has 
occurred. jones, 320 Md. at 259, 577 
A.2d at 69. In the Jones' situation the 
court explained that prior adjudication 
addressing the physician's negligence 
had never occurred. As such, the court 
concluded, the Joneses were not pre-
cluded from bringing suit as to any acts 
of negligence occurring within five years 
of filing their complaint. Id. 
Throughjones v. speed, 320 Md. 249, 
577 A.2d 64 (1990), the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland has clarified what 
constitutes a separate cause of action for 
negligence and thereby starts the accrual 
of Maryland's statute of limitations for 
medical malpractice. Where a physician 
repeatedly misdiagnoses his patient's 
condition due to negligence, each visit 
with the doctor may constitute a separ-
ate cause of action and thus, begin a new 
statute of limitations. 
- Michael P. CasEry 
In re Billman: DISPOSITION OF 
SUBSTITUTE ASSETS 
POSSESSED BY THIRD PARTY 
AND SUBJECT TO RICO 
FORFEITURE MAY BE ENJOINED 
In a case of first impression, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit ruled that it was within 
the power of the district court to enjoin 
the disposition of substitute assets pend-
ing criminal trial or forfeiture under 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations laws (RICO). The court held 
that the statute, codified at 18 U.S.c. 
1963, prohibited a defendant from avoid-
ing forfeiture of his substitute assets. As 
a result, transfer of a RICO target's assets 
to a third person who did not qualify as a 
bona fide purchaser for value did not 
place the assets beyond the court's 
jurisdiction. u.s. v. McKinnEry, 915 F.2d 
916 (4th Cir. 1990). The Fourth Circuit 
determined that Congress intended Sec-
tion 1963 to be construed liberally in 
order to effectuate its remedial purpose. 
The purpose, in the context of McKin-
nEry, was to preserve the defendant's 
substitute assets for ultimate forfeiture 
upon conviction. 
Tom). Billman, implicated in the fail-
ure of a savings and loan, was indicted 
for racketeering, fraud, and conspiracy 
to commit mail and wire fraud. Before 
the indictment was issued, however, Bill-
man became a fugitive. After Billman's 
flight, Barbara A. McKinney, an alleged 
co-conspirator, received a number of 
cryptic telephone calls from Billman's 
London attorney and from Billman him-
self. The purpose of these conversations 
was to arrange a wire transfer of approx-
imately $500,000 from the attorney to 
McKinney. In addition, McKinney agreed 
to accept $50,000 from William C. 
McKnew in order to discharge a debt 
that McKnewowed to Billman. The debt 
was listed among Billman's assets. 
At the commencement of the action, 
the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland entered a tempo-
rary restraining order (TRO) prohibit-
ing McKinney from disposing of the 
$550,000. McKinnEry, 915 F.2d at 919. 
The court subsequently held a hearing 
to determine the validity of the TRO, 
and to rule on a motion by the United 
States requesting an injunction restrain-
ing disposition of the funds pending the 
forfeiture proceedings. Id. 
The district court vacated the TRO 
and denied the government's motion for 
an injunction, reasoning that section 
1963 makes only those assets which the 
government proves are connected to 
the fugitive's alleged racketeering activ-
ity subject to pretrial restraint. Id. The 
court's decision was based on the govern-
ment's inability to trace $22,000,000 
deposited by the conspirators in Swiss 
bank accounts to the assets held by 
McKinney. Specifically, the lower court 
ruled that the government had failed to 
prove that the funds in question were 
actual RICO proceeds, and further de-
termined that after the wire transfer, the 
funds belonged to McKinney. Id. 
Believing that a more liberal reading 
of the statute was appropriate, the court 
of appeals held that an injunction should 
have been issued. Id. at 919-20. Com-
pelled to follow the lower court's find-
ings of fact the court treated the ques-
tioned funds as legitimate, despite its 
own opinion to the contrary. Id. at 920. 
Noting that under RICO the money was 
still subject to forfeiture as substitute 
assets, the court held that an injunction 
was proper against a third party who did 
not qualify as a bona fide purchaser for 
value. Thus, by determining that McKin-
ney was not a bona fide purchaser, the 
court held that the TRO was proper. Id. 
at 921. 
In its analysis of § 1963 (a)( 1) and 
(3), the court recognized that a forfei-
ture proceeding against funds derived 
from RICO criminal activity is "an in 
personam proceeding against the defen-
dant, and the forfeiture constitutes par-
tial punishment of the offense." McKin-
nEry, 915 F.2d at 920. 
Furthermore, amended section 1963 
( m ) provides for the forfeiture of substi-
tute assets when actual RICO proceeds 
are unavailable. Subsection (m) specifi-
cally provides that "[iJfanyofthe prop-
erty described in subsection (a), as a 
result of any act or omission of the 
defendant ... (3) has been placed be-
_________________________________ 21.2/The Law Forum - 39 
yond the jurisdiction of the courtj ... the 
court shall order the forfeiture of any 
other property of the defendant .... " 
McKinney, 915 F.2d at 920. Because Bill-
man was alleged to have placed the mis-
appropriated funds in Swiss banks, be-
yond the court's jurisdiction, the Fourth 
Circuit held that the district court could 
have properly ordered forfeiture of Bill-
man's substitute assets after his convic-
tion.ld. 
Under the court's reasoning, McKin-
ney's possession of Billman's substitute 
assets would not alter the government's 
entitlement to forfeiture after convic-
tion. The court observed that McKinney 
had presented insufficient evidence to 
meet the requirements of section 1963 
( c). Specifically, it was not shown that 
she was "a bona fide purchaserfor value 
of ... [the] property [in question] who at 
the time of purchase was reasonably 
without cause to believe that the prop-
erty was subject to forfeiture under this 
section." Id. 
Given its finding that the funds in 
McKinney's possession would be within 
the district court's jurisdiction follow-
ing Billman's conviction, the court 
turned to the remaining question of 
whether the substitute assets could be 
restrained pending trial. Id 
Section 1963(d)(I)(A) authorized 
the court, " [ u ]pon application of the 
United States ... [to] take any ... action 
to preserve the availability of property 
described in subsection (a) for forfei-
ture under this section," subject to cer-
tain procedural requirements. The court 
determined that the purpose of this sec-
tion was to prevent the disposal of prop-
erty which, upon conviction of a RICO 
defendant, would be subject to forfei-
ture.ld. at 921. In order to achieve this 
purpose, a liberal construction of sec-
tion 1963 was necessary, which required 
the court to read subsections (d)( 1) 
(a) and (m) together. Id 
Applying this liberal construction, the 
court of appeals held that "the pretrial 
restraining provisions of 1963 [did] not 
permit a defendant to thwart the opera-
tion of forfeiture laws by absconding 
with RICO proceeds and then transfer-
ring his substitute assets to a third per-
son who [did] not qualify as a bona fide 
purchaser for value." Id. 
In McKinney, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered for the first time whether a de-
fendant's substitute assets could be re-
strained pending criminal trial or for-
feiture under RICO. By construing sec-
tion 1963 liberally, the court held that a 
defendant's assets could be restrained if 
transferred to a person not qualifying as 
a bona fide purchaser for value. This 
reasoning was found to apply even where 
the assets were placed outside the juris-
diction of the court. 
The court's ruling has identified the 
broad reaching effect of section 1963 to 
freeze funds derived from activities RICO 
proscribes. The court has acted to ensure 
that even substitute proceeds could not 
easily be placed out of the reach of both 
the judiciary and the government offi-
cials charged with strict enforcement of 
the statute. In so doing, the Fourth Cir-
cuit guaranteed that justice was not eas-
ily evaded. Importantly, the court was 
the first at the federal circuit level to 
hold that a defendant's substitute assets 
could be restrained pending trial, an 
issue which has yet to be addressed by 
the Supreme Court. 
- Charles Szczesny 
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